Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable.
under the extension of particular moral concepts. As one grows into the moral community and acquires a morally sensitive outlook, one learns how to pick out which features aptly belong under the extension of a thick moral concept, and how to respond to the actions grouped together by this concept in certain ways. Mastery over moral concepts requires more than cognitively picking out natural descriptive features in the world, it requires a moral upbringing, moral eyes, and a moral point or purpose, and so a 'person from another culture who failed to see the evaluative point of a thick [moral] concept would not be able to predict local use of it on the basis of descriptive similarities alone' (Dancy 1996: 263) .
To recap: the non-cognitivist claimed that thick concepts contain distinct descriptive and evaluative components that can in principle be disentangled, and that since the latter component is simply a response to the former one, the extension of a thick moral concept can in principle be mastered by someone outside the viewpoint of the community of moral evaluators. Yet contrary to this claim, we saw that for thick concepts, evaluation partly determines description since we must rely on an evaluative outlook in order to pick out those features that aptly belong under the extension of the thick concept. For instance, only certain acts of strength and determination in the face of conflict are aptly 'courageous', and how these 'certain' acts are to be picked out is by South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2010) , in press. reference to the outlook of the community of moral evaluators. Resultantly, one cannot master the extension of a thick concept independently of evaluation. And since the extension of thick moral concepts is determined by both description and evaluation, McDowell argues that the noncognitivist is wrong to suppose that 'corresponding to any value concept, one can always isolate a genuine feature of the world… a feature that is there anyway, independently of anyone's value experience being as it is -to be that which competent users of the concept are to be regarded as responding when they use it ' (1981: 144) . Description, considered by the non-cognitivist as something distinct and separable from evaluation, is insufficient for those outside the community of moral evaluators to master the extension of thick moral concepts because thick concepts have both descriptive and evaluative shape. Therefore, contra non-cognitivism, evaluation is not something that can simply be 'disentangled' away from the thick concept.
The Objective Conception of Rules: Psychologically Grasping Independently Fixed Rules
It's commonly understood that in order to correctly apply a concept, moral or otherwise, to the same types of things, one must use the concept in accord with the rule for its application: for 'judgments or utterances to be intelligible as applications of a single concept to different objects,
[they] must belong to a practice of going on doing the same thing' (McDowell 1981: 145) . This 'going on to do the same thing' is typically conceived by the non-cognitivist as fixed by rules that determines a concept's correct application. Such rules are fixed 'independently of the responses and reactions a propensity to which one acquires when one learns the practice [involving the rule] itself' (McDowell 1981: 146) because, presumably, if rules were not independent of human responses then we would be unable to account for the normativity of rules, i.e. that one's responses can be wrong. By accounting for the fixedness or objectivity of rules on the grounds that rules are independent of human responses, the non-cognitivist assumes that rules can only be objectively fixed within the objective account of the world offered by the absolute conception. Accounting for the fixedness of rules outside of the absolute conception's framework strikes the non-cognitivist as simply implausible. As Gibbard says:
I think I get the idea of a non-objectivist model, where we see… judgments as a cultural artifact. But where in this model is there room for truth and falsehood? There is only a way of living (1992: 269) . Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2010) , in press. However, an account of the fixedness of rules does not yet give us an account of how we grasp and act in accord with rules. So corresponding to their account of the fixedness of rules, noncognitivists must further provide an account of how we grasp and act in accord with these rules. Unsurprisingly, the non-cognitivist explains our ability to grasp and act in accord with rules by positing some 'special psychic mechanism that ties discussion to action' (Gibbard 1992: 278) .
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Presumably, it's because we possess the appropriate psychological machinery that we can grasp rules and act in accord with them. So the non-cognitivist offers a two-component account of rulefollowing involving (1) that there are rules fixed independently of human responses, and (2) that humans possess psychological machinery by which we can grasp these independently fixed rules and act in accord with them. If the non-cognitivist lacks (1), then there are no rules for humans to psychologically grasp and act in accord with. If the non-cognitivist lacks (2), then there are no means for human to grasp rules and act in accord with them.
So the non-cognitivist account of rule-following is successful just in case (1) and (2) are both accounted for. McDowell's strategy against the non-cognitivist account of rule-following then, is to use Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations to discredit (2), thereby rendering (1) suspect.
McDowell clearly suggests that this is his strategy: the idea that the rules of a practice mark out rails traceable independently of the reactions of participants is suspect… and insistence that wherever there is going on in the same way there must be rules that can be conceived as marking out such independently traceable rails involves a misconception… We can begin working up to this conclusion by coming to appreciate the emptiness… of the psychological component of the picture: that is, the idea that grasp of a rule is a matter of having one's mental wheels engaged with an independently traceable rail (1981: 146).
McDowell later continues:
The [non-cognitivist] picture [we are considering here] has two interlocking components: the idea of the psychological mechanism correlates with the idea that the tracks we follow are objectively there to be followed, in a way that transcends the reactions and responses of participants in our practices. If the first component is suspect, the second component should be suspect to. And it is (1981: 150) . Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2010) (Lang 2001: 191) and Olle Blomberg (2007) doesn't discuss (2) at all. I think that Lang and Blomberg pose unconvincing arguments against McDowell because they fail to appreciate (and adequately articulate) this aspect of McDowell's Wittgensteinian argument. In this section I'll discuss the crucial argument against (2), which is a neglected yet central aspect of
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McDowell's argument. In §7 I'll explain how the rule-following considerations cause problems for non-cognitivist accounts of thick concepts in general, and in §8 and §10 I'll return to offer particular arguments against Lang and Blomberg, respectively.
One might conceive of an initial argument against the non-cognitivist's (2) along the following lines. Imagine that a child, Jones, has correctly solved a finite set of addition problems involving numbers < 57. After sampling Jones's finite success with such problems, we claim that 'Jones understands the plus rule'. To account for the 'continuity' of Jones's behavior in these cases, we posit the rule 'plus' as one that is fixed independently of the responses of Jones and other problem solvers (Wittgenstein 1953 : §218) and we posit a psychological mechanism in Jones by virtue of which this rule is grasped (Wittgenstein 1953: §146) . But, as this argument might go, how does positing a psychic grasp of the 'plus' rule account for the 'continuity' of Jones's behavior? For consider also the following rules: (i) quus: denoted by '' where x  y = x + y, if x, y < 57, but = 5 otherwise (Kripke 1982: 9) (ii) guus: denoted by ' Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2010) , in press. such a mediating mental state based on Jones's previous behavior gets us no further in understanding how Jones's behavior will continue. Or, imagine that in a new case Jones is given a problem involving numbers > 57, e.g. '67 + 92'. He answers '7', and insists that this is how the rule he had learned was to continue (e.g. he says confidently, 'I know it! Seriously, the rule continues like this…'). Although Jones's response here strikes us as odd, his response is still compatible with the examples from which he learned to solve problems, which all involved numbers < 57. Again, this shows 'that his behavior hitherto was not guided by the psychological conformation we were picturing as guiding it' and that 'the pictured state, then, always transcends any grounds there may be for postulating it ' (McDowell 1981: 147) . As a result, the 'postulation of the mediating state is an idle intervening step; it does nothing to underwrite the confidence of our expectation [of an agent's behavior]' (McDowell 1981: 148) . Therefore, the positing of such a psychic 'grasp' does nothing to ground the continuity of Jones's (or any agent's) behavior. However, the problem with the non-cognitivist account of rule-following is not just that some finite behavior can be interpreted by infinitely many rules, although one might see that as a problem (Kripke 1982: 8-27) . For if that's all the problem consists in then the non-cognitivist can still claim that there really are infinitely many independently fixed rules out in reality, and all that needs to be provided is a convincing story for how one psychically grasps the right rule. That is, the non-cognitivist might still think of 'grasping a rule' as coming to possess the right mediating mental state -the mental state the wheels of which engage with the right independently traceable rule-road -and so think that it's the possession of a mediating mental state that's essential to grasping a rule.
To see why this view fails, let's review a variety of ways it might take shape. Account 1: when we grasp a rule we acquire a mediating mental state the content of which encodes a descriptive procedure for how we are to act in accord with the rule (Wittgenstein 1953: §197; Kripke 1982: 10-22) . But what exactly is encoded as the content of what we've grasped? One might suggest that the content consists in a descriptive list of procedures. On this view, grasping the plus rule consists in grasping that '1 + 1 = 2', '1 + 2 = 3', '1 + 3 = 4', and so on. But it's surely not the case that in grasping a rule, its entire application somehow appears before the agent's mind (Wittgenstein 1953: connection between grasping a rule and subsequently applying it was too loose. Encoding rules with further rules made fixing on an action impossible. And Accounts 1-2 required that we understand a rule before we can grasp it, which puts the cart before the horse. The failure of these accounts shows us that the connection between grasping a rule and subsequently applying it is not plausibly established via the mediation of that rule somehow appearing before our minds. Furthermore, even if a rule did appear before one's mind, we can easily imagine that what appears before the mind of an agent that correctly applies a rule can also appear before the mind of an agent that does not correctly apply it (Wittgenstein 1953: §152) rule is and what it takes to act in accord with it. Upon closer inspection we find that 'there is no such thing here as, so to say, a wheel that he is to catch hold of, the right machine which, once chosen, will carry him on automatically' (Wittgenstein 1970: §304) . We see, therefore, that the noncognitivist's view of rule-following not only fails to explain how we can grasp and act in accord with rules, but also fails to suggest a realistic picture of how this is to be achieved. For if we consider how students actually learn rules in concrete cases, we see that all that's involved is a certain (usually South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2010) , in press. extensive) training (Wittgenstein 1953: §198) ; training into a communal practice where students learn to develop a knack, technical skill, or ingrained sensibility to act and react as others do within their practice. We do not in real cases expect a student to acquire mastery of a rule 'in a flash' via a psychic grasp of all the possible instances of a rule. Rather, we expect the student to progressively become better at mastering the rule as their skill develops and as their involvement, in the practice where that rule functions, matures. As McDowell rightly points out: the structure of the space of reasons is not constituted in splendid isolation from anything merely human. The demands of reason are essentially such that a human upbringing can open a human being's eyes to them (1996: 92).
Our Rules, Culture, and Nature
The 'objective' conception of rules appealed to non-cognitivists because they thought it only makes sense to say that one correctly acts in accord with a rule if there are independently fixed rules that one is capable of psychically grasping. Accordingly, they thought that it only makes sense to say that one correctly applies a concept, moral or otherwise, if there are independently fixed rules for the application of that concept that one is capable of psychically grasping. In other words, the noncognitivist assumes the objective conception of rule-following in an attempt to account for the normativity of concept application; to explain how it is that an application of a concept, moral or otherwise, can go wrong. The problem with 'non-objective' accounts of rules, as Gibbard expressed earlier, is that they seem unable to account for the fixedness, and so normativity, of rules. That is, one might worry that by rejecting the objective conception of rules, the Wittgensteinian analysis has led us to what Michael Dummett has called 'full-blooded conventionalism', the view that a given statement's necessity and truth 'consists always in our having expressly decided to treat that very statement as unassailable ' (1959: 329, 337, 348; McDowell 1981: 150-152 ). The worry is that because there are no independently fixed rules for us to grasp, our treating any statement as true or false must ultimately result from a decision of how to treat that statement. But if the truth-value of a statement is a result of our decisions, then the truth-value of any statement is as flexible as our decisions are, and in that case we can no longer account for how our decisions about the truth-value of statements can be wrong. The general worry is that non-objective conceptions of rules must also be non-normative ones. Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2010) , in press. One of Wittgenstein's philosophical contributions was in showing that this worry is misplaced. By bringing rules out of individual minds and into the public space of culture, he avoids the worrisome claim that it's the decisions of individuals that determines the truth-value of statements. Indeed, the very point of dismantling Accounts 1-4 in §5 was to show that our rulefollowing ability is not suitably grounded in the mind (and hence the decisions) of individuals at all (Wittgenstein 1974: II, §33, 70) . As Wittgenstein argues in Philosophical Investigations:
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'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it (1953: 202).
Gibbard and others that worry that non-objective conceptions of rules must also be nonnormative ones have missed this point. Rules are not 'in the mind' at all, but are rather diachronically stable patterns of activity that have been shaped by the shared sensitivities and responsive actions of the agent's involved in the communal practice in which that rule has the particular function that it does (Wittgenstein 1953: §198-199) . Like a well-trodden path through the wilderness, a rule receives its significance in part by the history of its use, the constitution of its users, and the purpose for which they used it, while further hinting at the direction for how it should continue.
A rule is a constituent path within a community-wide practice, and because of its public nature, what constitutes following in accord with a rule is not some individual's decision. Insofar as rules are not already 'out there' independently fixed from human response, our 'going on in the same way' in accord with a rule is contingent in that it depends upon facts regarding our natural and socio-cultural constitution and tendencies. But it would be confused to think that this entails that our 'going on in the same way' in accord with a rule is decidedly arbitrary. I suggest that it's just a contingent fact that we are born into a world equipped with needs (e.g. to eat and mate, etc.), purposes to achieve (e.g. to acquire food and mates, etc.), and instinctive sensitivities (e.g. to see things as edible or mate-able, etc.) and for, presumably evolutionary, reasons, nature has it that those of us who are alive today share in our basic needs, purposes, and sentient architecture such that we can work to attain these together. It's this common rootedness in nature, need, and purpose that It's clear from these examples that Blackburn thinks that the extension of a thick concept is determined by descriptive features alone (e.g. weight), and that an evaluative attitude (e.g. as carried by the tone) can be disentangled from the description, and even removed, without alteration to that concept's shape. So on Blackburn's view, applying a thick concept to Pavarotti is similar to applying a descriptive concept to Pavarotti but with a tone in your voice that, considering the context of your speech act, licenses the hearer to suppose that you are expressing an attitude towards Pavarotti on South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2010) , in press. the basis of the applied description (Blackburn 1992: 289, 297) . And in general, to utter an evaluative statement is similar to uttering a descriptive statement with a tone in your voice that, considering the context of your speech act, licenses the hearer to suppose that you are expressing an attitude on the basis of the description. Blackburn thinks this analysis of his has undermined the McDowellian picture of thick terms.
There are several points to make here. First, Blackburn hasn't really offered an independent argument against McDowell on behalf of the legitimacy of the disentangling manoeuvre. Blackburn simply presupposes its legitimacy in the examples he uses to support non-cognitivism. In the Pavarotti example above, for instance, he simply assumes that the extension of the thick concept 'fat' is determined by descriptive features alone (e.g. weight), and that an evaluative attitude (e.g. as carried by the tone) can be disentangled from the description, and even removed, without alteration to that concept's shape. But as I argued in §4, an evaluative outlook is required in order to determine the extension of a thick concept, so even the thick concept 'fat' cannot be determined by descriptive features alone. For instance, during Arnold Schwarzenegger's bodybuilding career he had a competition weight of 240-250 pounds, but as evidenced by the fact that he won Mr. Olympia seven times, it's clearly not appropriate to apply the thick concept 'fat' to him on the basis of his weight alone. And surely there are voluptuous women, such as the supermodel Tyra Banks, to which the thick concept 'fat' would be an inapt application in spite of the fact that they are heavier than less voluptuous women that couldn't make it as supermodels. So the legitimacy of the disentangling manoeuvre is not something that one can simply assume.
Blackburn attempted to motivate his non-cognitivism by pointing out that although one can be 'industrious', one can be too 'industrious'. This was supposed to show that there is no attitude, e.g. Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2010) , in press. direction for that object runs parallel to the reason why, in §8, Blomberg claimed that 'Hare's attribution [that one must accept the evaluation embedded in the community where the thick concept functions in order to master that concept's extension] is not entirely unwarranted'. Given what I showed in §8 in response to Blomberg and Altham, we can see that the problem with Blackburn's criticism rests on his mistakenly conflating an evaluative point with an evaluative direction.
Blackburn assumes that if there is no singularly stable evaluative attitude connected to a thick concept, then there is no 'thickness' to that concept at all and that we should therefore be able to master that concept without an evaluative outlook. But it doesn't follow that because it's not required that a thick concept have a singularly stable evaluative direction, that a thick concept can therefore be mastered independently of a sensitivity to its evaluative point. Indeed, in §8 I explained how, although one will find a particular evaluative direction natural to a thick concept by virtue of that evaluative direction being in line with the purpose for which the evaluative point was taught, there needn't be a singularly stable evaluative direction for a thick concept at all.
In §8 I pointed out that moral education has a socio-cultural function, and when one acquires mastery over a thick moral concept one acquires a sensitivity to an evaluative point for a particular purpose or purposes. However, evaluative directions can change and one can be pulled in different directions, because the purpose or purposes for which one learns an evaluative point needn't be singular. In fact, they are presumably as complicated as our social networks and lives are.
Of course for each thick concept there will be an evaluative direction that one finds most natural (i.e. the thick concept's 'default direction'). And this is clearly the case since even Blackburn relied upon a thick concept's natural evaluative direction in order to suggest that thick concepts have no evaluative direction. That is, Blackburn initially attempted to motivate his non-cognitivism by pointing out that although one can be 'industrious', one can be too 'industrious'. What's important to notice is that Blackburn clearly could not arouse our intuition that 'industrious' is to be negatively evaluated without augmenting 'industrious' with 'too', which is defined evaluatively as 'an excessive extent or degree; beyond what is desirable, fitting, or right' (Collins English Dictionary 2003) . That is, our default understanding of 'Jones is industrious' or 'Jones is courageous' is with a positive evaluative direction, and augmenting such statements with 'too' alters our understanding on semantic grounds because saying of X that it is too X is to say that X is 'excessive [in] extent or degree; beyond what is desirable, fitting, or right'. It is to express semantically that something that we may have had a pro-attitude towards is excessive to the extent that it is no longer apt for a proSouth African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2010) , in press. attitude. So if attitudes are really as fluid and inessential to thick concepts as Blackburn suggests, then it's at least suspicious why Blackburn found it necessary to augment the thick concept 'industrious' with 'too' to make his point. Strangely, Blackburn relies on the natural evaluative directions of thick concepts in attempting to prove that such concepts have no natural evaluative directions at all. I find this move on Blackburn's part suspect. Therefore, it's clear that Blackburn has not only failed to convincingly criticize the evaluative nature of thick concepts (of which he thinks there are none), but has also failed (along with other non-cognitivists) to defend the legitimacy of his use of the disentangling manoeuvre against McDowell's arguments.
Thick Moral Concepts and the Moral of Thick Concepts: Concluding Remarks
More than fifty years after Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, non-cognitivists are still motivated by a naturalism that takes for granted the external viewpoint of the absolute conception (Blomberg 2007: 64) . In line with this external viewpoint, the non-cognitivist thought that in order to apply a concept correctly, one must psychically grasp a rule for its correct application that is fixed independently of human responses. We saw how McDowell used Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations to show that this view is fancifully false, and that this view imposes on us the demand that we transcend the bounds of our cognitive powers (McDowell 1981: 153) . However, as demanding as the non-cognitivist position is, it has itself been unable to account for even the simplest cases of moral reasoning (See especially Schueler 1988; van Roojen 1996; Unwin 1999; Schroeder 2008) .
Take an example of moral reasoning from Geach (1965: 463): If doing a thing is bad, getting you little brother to do it is bad.
Tormenting the cat is bad.
Ergo, getting your little brother to torment the cat is bad.
The problem here, which is known as the Frege-Geach problem, is that:
The whole nerve of the reasoning is that "bad" should mean exactly the same at all four occurrences -should not, for example, shift from an evaluative to a descriptive… use. But in the major premise the speaker… is certainly not uttering acts of condemnation (Geach 1965: 463-464) .
